Influx of Al Qaeda, money into Pakistan is seen
U.S. officials say the terrorist network's command base is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq.
By Greg Miller, Times Staff Writer
May 20, 2007 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...=la-home-center


WASHINGTON — A major CIA effort launched last year to hunt down Osama bin Laden has produced no significant leads on his whereabouts, but has helped track an alarming increase in the movement of Al Qaeda operatives and money into Pakistan's tribal territories, according to senior U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation.

In one of the most troubling trends, U.S. officials said that Al Qaeda's command base in Pakistan is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq, where the terrorist network's operatives are raising substantial sums from donations to the anti-American insurgency as well as kidnappings of wealthy Iraqis and other criminal activity.

The influx of money has bolstered Al Qaeda's leadership ranks at a time when the core command is regrouping and reasserting influence over its far-flung network. The trend also signals a reversal in the traditional flow of Al Qaeda funds, with the network's leadership surviving to a large extent on money coming in from its most profitable franchise, rather than distributing funds from headquarters to distant cells.

Al Qaeda's efforts were aided, intelligence officials said, by Pakistan's withdrawal in September of tens of thousands of troops from the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border where Bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, are believed to be hiding.

Little more than a year ago, Al Qaeda's core command was thought to be in a financial crunch. But U.S. officials said cash shipped from Iraq has eased those troubles.

"Iraq is a big moneymaker for them," said a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official.

The evolving picture of Al Qaeda's finances is based in part on intelligence from an aggressive effort launched last year to intensify the pressure on Bin Laden and his senior deputies.

As part of a so-called surge in personnel, the CIA deployed as many as 50 clandestine operatives to Pakistan and Afghanistan — a dramatic increase over the number of CIA case officers permanently stationed in those countries. All of the new arrivals were given the primary objective of finding what counter-terrorism officials call "HVT1" and "HVT2." Those "high value target" designations refer to Bin Laden and Zawahiri.

The surge was part of a broader shake-up at the CIA designed to refocus on the hunt for Bin Laden, officials said. One former high-ranking agency official said the CIA had formed a task force that involved officials from all four directorates at the agency, including analysts, scientists and technical experts, as well as covert operators.

The officials were charged with reinvigorating a search that had atrophied when some U.S. intelligence assets and special forces teams were pulled out of Afghanistan in 2002 to prepare for the war with Iraq.



Arduous search

Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence and military officials said, the surge has yet to produce a single lead on Bin Laden's or Zawahiri's location that could be substantiated.

"We're not any closer," said a senior U.S. military official who monitors the intelligence on the hunt for Bin Laden.

The lack of progress underscores the difficulty of the search more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks. Despite a $25-million U.S. reward, current and former intelligence officials said, the United States has not had a lead on Bin Laden since he fled American and Afghan forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan in early 2002.

"We've had no significant report of him being anywhere," said a former senior CIA official who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke on condition of anonymity when discussing U.S. intelligence operations. U.S. spy agencies have not even had information that "you could validate historically," the official said, meaning a tip on a previous Bin Laden location that could subsequently be verified.

President Bush is given detailed presentations on the hunt's progress every two to four months, in addition to routine counter-terrorism briefings, intelligence officials said.

The presentations include "complex schematics, search patterns, what we're doing, where the Predator flies," said one participant, referring to flights by unmanned airplanes used in the search. The CIA has even used sand models to illustrate the topography of the mountainous terrain where Bin Laden is believed to be hiding.

Still, officials said, they have been unable to answer the basic question of whether they are getting closer to their target.

"Any prediction on when we're going to get him is just ridiculous," said the senior U.S. counter-terrorism official. "It could be a year from now or the Pakistanis could be in the process of getting him right now."

In a written response to questions from The Times, the CIA said it "does not as a rule discuss publicly the details of clandestine operations," but acknowledged it had stepped up operations against Bin Laden and defended their effectiveness.

"The surge has been modest in size, here and overseas, but has added new skills and fresh thinking to the fight against a resilient and adaptive foe," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said in the statement. "It has paid off, generating more information about Al Qaeda and helping take terrorists off the street."

The CIA spies are part of a broader espionage arsenal aimed at Bin Laden and Zawahiri that includes satellites, electronic eavesdropping stations and the unmanned airplanes.



Pakistan pullout

Current and former U.S. intelligence officials involved in the surge said it had been hobbled by a number of other developments. Chief among them, they said, was Pakistan's troop pullout last year from border regions where the hunt has been focused.

Just months after the CIA deployed dozens of additional operatives to its station in Islamabad — as well as bases in Peshawar and other locations — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced "peace agreements" with tribal leaders in Waziristan.

Driven by domestic political pressures and rising anti-American sentiment, the agreements called for the tribes to rein in the activities of foreign fighters, and bar them from launching attacks in Afghanistan, in exchange for a Pakistani military pullback.

But U.S. officials said there was little evidence that the tribal groups had followed through.

"Everything was undermined by the so-called peace agreement in north Waziristan," said a senior U.S. intelligence official responsible for overseeing counter-terrorism operations. "Of all the things that work against us in the global war on terror, that's the most damaging development. The one thing Al Qaeda needs to plan an attack is a relatively safe place to operate."

Some in the administration initially expressed concern over the Pakistani move, but Bush later praised it, following a White House meeting with Musharraf.

The pullback took significant pressure off Al Qaeda leaders and the tribal groups protecting them. It also made travel easier for operatives migrating to Pakistan after taking part in the insurgency in Iraq.

Some of these veterans are leading training at newly established camps, and are positioned to become the "next generation of leadership" in the organization, said the former senior CIA official.

"Al Qaeda is dependent on a lot of leaders coming out of Iraq for its own viability," said the former official, who recently left the agency. "It's these sorts of guys who carry out operations."

The former official added that the resurgent Taliban forces in Afghanistan are "being schooled" by Al Qaeda operatives with experience fighting U.S. forces in Iraq.

The administration's concern was underscored when Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy CIA Director Stephen Kappes visited Musharraf in Pakistan in February to prod him to crack down on Al Qaeda and its training camps.

The Pakistani pullback also has reopened financial channels that had been constricted by the military presence.

The senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said there were "lots of indications they can move people in and out easier," and that operatives from Iraq often bring cash.

"A year ago we were saying they were having serious money problems," the official said. "That seems to have eased up."

The cash is mainly U.S. currency in relatively modest sums — tens of thousands of dollars. The scale of the payments suggests the money is not meant for funding elaborate terrorist plots, but instead for covering the day-to-day costs of Al Qaeda's command: paying off tribal leaders, hiring security and buying provisions.



Contributors mobilized

Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, as the network's Iraq branch is known, has drawn increasingly large contributions from elsewhere in the Muslim world — largely because the fight against U.S. forces has mobilized donors across the Middle East, officials said.

"Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is the reason people are contributing again, with money and private contributions coming back in from the Gulf," said the senior U.S. counter-terrorism official. He added that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia also has become an effective criminal enterprise.

"The insurgents have great businesses they run: stealing cars, kidnapping people, protection money," the counter-terrorism official said. The former CIA official said the activity is so extensive that the "ransom-for-profit business in Iraq reminds me of Colombia and Mexico in the 1980s and '90s."

U.S. officials got a glimpse of the Al Qaeda leadership's financial dependency when American forces intercepted a lengthy letter Zawahiri sent to now-deceased Iraq insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi in 2005. In the letter, Zawahiri alluded to financial difficulties, saying "the lines have been cut off," and asked Zarqawi for fresh funds.

"We need a payment while new lines are being opened," Zawahiri wrote, according to a translation released publicly by the U.S. government. "So, if you're capable of sending a payment of approximately one hundred thousand, we'll be very grateful to you."

The payments appear to have given Al Qaeda leaders in Iraq new influence in the organization, officials said. In particular, officials noted that Zawahiri appears to have abandoned his effort to persuade Sunni Arab insurgents not to divide Muslims by striking Shiites, and has more recently moved closer to sanctioning such bloodshed.

U.S. officials believe they had Zawahiri in their sights on at least one occasion. Acting on reports that Zawahiri was to attend an Al Qaeda gathering in a remote village in northwest Pakistan in January 2006, the CIA launched a missile strike on the compound, missing Zawahiri but killing a senior Al Qaeda operations commander. U.S. officials believe Zawahiri changed plans at the last minute.

Within months of that strike, the CIA began sending dozens of additional case officers to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The impetus for the surge is unclear. Several former CIA officials said it was launched at the direction of former CIA Director Porter J. Goss, and that the White House had been pushing the agency to step up the effort to find Bin Laden.

But the CIA disputed those accounts, saying in its written statement that "this initiative was and is driven solely by operational considerations." The effort, according to CIA spokesman Gimigliano, grew out of an assessment in mid-2005 in which "the agency itself identified changes in the operational landscape against Al Qaeda."

Several months before the surge, the CIA disbanded a special unit known as "Alec Station" that had led the search for Bin Laden. At the time, the move was seen as a sign that the hunt was being downgraded, but officials said it was a prelude to a broader reorganization.

The surge included what one former CIA official described as a "new breed" of spy developed since the Sept. 11 attacks. These so-called "targeting officers" are given a blend of analytic and operational training to become specialists in sifting clues to the locations of high-value fugitives.

The CIA's ability to send spies into the tribal region is limited, officials said.

"We can't go into the tribal areas without protection," said the former CIA official who was involved in the planning of the surge. "For the most part they have to travel with [the Pakistan intelligence service] and their footprint is not small because they're worried about getting shot too."

Instead, the effort is designed to cultivate sources in the outer perimeters of the security networks that guard Bin Laden, and gradually work inward.

The aim, another former CIA official said, is "to find people who had access to people who had access to his movements. It's pretty basic stuff."


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greg.miller@latimes.com




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A Mexican cartel army's war within
Hit men known as the Zetas use

G4A: good catch...

Coming to grips with terrorism and turmoil

Coming to grips with terrorism and turmoil
Email Print Normal font Large font May 22, 2007

Editorial

http://www.theage.com.au/news/editorial/co...601325121.html#

There are many keys to unlocking the gates into the world of jihadist terror groups, especially to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but surely the hardest to turn is that marked "Pakistan". The country of more than 160 million people, 97 per cent of whom are Muslim (77 per cent Sunni and 20 per cent Shiite), is the shadow player in the West's battle with terrorism. The implications of its long border with Afghanistan, its complex internal politics and its fractious relationship with its neighbours, particularly India, when taken as a whole have consequences not only for the security of the region, but the world. A Pakistan in turmoil, without firm leadership, by which it must not be construed a dictatorship, threatens everything.

The confluence of several related developments in and about Pakistan give serious cause for concern. First is the stability of the Government. Anti-government demonstrations in the past two weeks have left almost 50 people dead, and previous to that there have been attacks from extremist Islamic groups on government officials, police, schools and churches. The President, Pervez Musharraf, is also under increasing pressure after he sacked the chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, who was becoming too independently minded for the general. Now, exiled former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has said she is going to return to Pakistan to campaign against him in forthcoming elections.

General Musharraf is not a novice to the heat of battle. He, after all, only came to power via a coup in 1999, after which he suspended the constitution and gave himself the title of chief executive, and then a few years later that of president. In 2002, he extended the term for five years. He now wants this tenure extended.

In one respect, 9/11 aided his hold on power. In the days following the 2001 attacks, the United States moved to strengthen its relationship with India and Pakistan. President George Bush authorised the lifting of sanctions that had been imposed after both countries had conducted nuclear tests in 1998. The US needed General Musharraf on side if it were to have any hope of tracking down those responsible for the attacks on its soil. Pakistan's border with Afghanistan was, and is, a crucial front in dealing with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US has flooded money into Pakistan since 9/11, averaging $US80 million ($A97 million) a month as "reimbursement" for military expenses, notably patrolling the border. General Musharraf, however, downgraded the patrols about the middle of last year after he said an agreement had been reached with tribal leaders who would contain the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This seems more shadow-boxing than the real thing. General Musharraf has looked upon the Taliban in benevolent terms as helping to maintain Pakistan's security. There also have been many questions raised over the links between Pakistan's intelligence organisation, the ISI, and extremist Islamic groups. The most worrying trend is the consolidation and growth of al-Qaeda operations in those regions where General Musharraf has pulled out his troops. US newspapers have reported the CIA saying that al-Qaeda in Pakistan is financed by money coming out of Iraq. This is a circle of profiteering from violence that must be broken. The anarchic situation in Iraq is fuelling the very forces the West said it was there to vanquish.

Pakistan has come back into Western focus because of the shift in thinking towards Afghanistan. The rush to invade Iraq in 2003 put Afghanistan on the backburner, and the West has, as a consequence, paid a price for doing so in the re-emergence of the Taliban. The urgency with which Western forces, including Australia, are trying to thwart the group's influence will mean nothing if they do not have the co-operation of Pakistan. And therein lies the problem; how to balance the many competing and seemingly contradictory forces at play so as to achieve the best possible outcomes for stability and peace.

Unfortunately, there is no quick-fix solution. The signs in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections are not good. General Musharraf is known as a strong-arm leader — indeed, political niceties had little to do with his coming to power — but for the sake of his country's stability, and hence the region's, he must place his faith in democracy.

Six Questions for Marc Lynch on Iraq, the “Surge,” and Al Qaeda
Ken Silverstein, Dissident Voice



May 19, 2007

Marc Lynch is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at George Washington University and the Elliott School of International Affairs. He is the author of Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today, and runs the influential Middle East politics blog Abu Aardvark. We talked by phone yesterday about recent developments in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq.

This article was first published at Harper’s.

1. What’s your assessment of the impact thus far of the "surge"?

It’s going about as expected, changing the distribution of violence a bit but not making much difference in the core strategic issues. It would be easy to just look at the trends in violence, but that’s not really the point. When the administration laid out its plan, it said some of the right things, like that success should not be judged on military outcomes and body counts. Their argument was that the surge would create a secure political space that would allow for political reconciliation. So far, the opposite has happened; there’s been little progress towards reaching a new political compromise and if anything the distance between the sides seems to be growing. On the military side, there have been some interesting developments in Anbar province, like you’ve been reading about in the press lately, but that has little to do with the "surge."

2. What is going on in Anbar?

There really is a palpable turn there against Al Qaeda, that isn’t just the usual wishful thinking that so often takes the place of real analysis. A lot of people have interpreted this as a sign of American strength, that the Sunni tribes are shifting to the winning side. It’s actually just the opposite, it’s a defensive reaction by Sunnis to Al Qaeda’s increasing strength and aggressiveness. Sunni resentment of Al Qaeda in Iraq really dates to last October, long before the "surge," when Al Qaeda declared the Islamic State of Iraq. A lot of us thought at the time that they did this for strictly propaganda purposes, but it developed into an aggressive bid for hegemony over the entire insurgency. The Islamic State of Iraq became very aggressive towards other insurgency groups and local Sunnis, intimidating ordinary people, declaring them to be non-Muslims, and using that as a justification for seizing property and killing leaders of other groups. This created a backlash; we’re seeing an open turn against Al Qaeda not just by local tribal sheiks and ordinary people but also by the leaders of the insurgency.

The insurgents are very critical of Al Qaeda, its treatment of Sunnis and its extreme interpretation of Islam, but at the same time they are deeply committed to continued resistance to the American occupation.

3. How are the tensions between the local insurgents and Al Qaeda playing out on the ground?

The American media has focused on the Anbar Salvation Council, a group of tribal sheikhs that have asked the American military for help against Al Qaeda. But they really aren’t that important – what matters is that the major insurgency groups have turned on the Islamic State of Iraq project. The split really got serious in early April, when the Islamic Army of Iraq, which is one of largest insurgent factions, openly broke with Al Qaeda and issued a scathing denunciation of the Islamic State in Iraq. A number of other factions joined in, and now they’ve formed something called the Reform and Jihad Front. There are two main issues: local grievances and some real strategic differences. The insurgents are very critical of Al Qaeda, its treatment of Sunnis and its extreme interpretation of Islam, but at the same time they are deeply committed to continued resistance to the American occupation. They want a less divided and more effective resistance, not an end to resistance. But there’s also a real divide in strategy that goes beyond the local grievances, which Americans really need to understand. Al Qaeda wants the United States to stay in Iraq as long as possible. It gets tremendous benefits from having American troops close at hand to kill – Iraq is the primary source of its propaganda and recruitment, and an integral part of its global strategy. They really want to turn Iraq into a base for exporting global jihad. But these major insurgency factions are focused on driving Americans out of Iraq and creating a political system that gives Sunnis a reasonable stake in politics.

The insurgents have made it pretty clear in a series of public statements and private communications that they’re willing to start talking and dampen down the violence if the United States commits to withdrawing from Iraq.

4. Whatever the cause of the split, isn’t it good news either way?

Only if we get our strategy right and learn the right lessons. From an American point of view, if you believe that the "surge" has emboldened the Sunnis to turn against Al Qaeda than what follows is that we should stay for a long time, reassure our allies, and wipe out Al Qaeda. But if you believe, as I do, that the major insurgency groups that are turning against Al Qaeda mainly want the United States to get out and then rejoin the political system, it leads to another conclusion. If you listen to what these insurgency factions are saying, what Hareth al-Dhari of the Association of Muslim Scholars is saying, they couldn’t be making it more clear: make a credible commitment to withdrawing and the insurgency will dampen down and we’ll take care of the Al Qaeda groups out of our own self-interest. Just to be clear, I’m not saying the mainstream insurgents are good guys. They have the most American blood on their hands, but that’s precisely why we can’t ignore them, it’s why we’ve been exploring the possibility of talking to them in the past, and it’s why any sustainable deal in Iraq will require bringing them in.

5. So what’s the best policy choice at this point?

The United States should commit to a withdrawal, not tomorrow but with a clear endpoint – benchmarks, or whatever you want to call them. The insurgents have made it pretty clear in a series of public statements and private communications that they’re willing to start talking and dampen down the violence if the United States commits to withdrawing from Iraq. We’re at a moment where there’s actually a chance for positive developments, because we have a common interest with the insurgents in defeating Al Qaeda and they are putting out clear signals that they are willing to make a deal. But everything hinges on the United States making a commitment to withdraw – politically, they can’t and won’t get in the political game without that because it would destroy their credibility and because, frankly, getting the United States out really matters to them. But there’s a window here that I’m afraid we’re going to let close because of domestic politics. The insurgency factions turned against Al Qaeda because its Islamic State of Iraq project has been growing in strength, and if they can’t show some gains soon the tide may turn against them within the Sunni community.

6. Beyond Iraq, how is Al Qaeda doing in other parts of the world?

Al Qaeda is trying to spread its jihadist world view, the notion of a fundamental clash of civilizations and the idea that Islam is under threat. It’s remarkable how rapidly and deeply this way of understanding the world is becoming entrenched in the Arab world. At the same time, neither Al Qaeda as an organization nor bin Laden as an individual is commanding a great deal of respect or support. When you get these attacks in Algeria and Morocco, it repels people rather than attracting them. But the paradox is that even as Al Qaeda repels people with its actions, its core ideas are becoming more widely accepted, and that’s really troubling, and a real indictment of American public diplomacy. That’s also why the situation in Iraq is so devastating at the wider regional and global level. Killing people in Morocco and Algeria triggers a negative reaction, but fighting Americans in Iraq resonates with a much wider part of the Arab population. The Project on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland conducted a survey of Muslim public opinion a few months ago. 91 percent of Egyptians disapproved of attacks against civilians in the United States and only 7 percent disagreed with the statement that "groups that use violence against civilians, such as Al Qaeda, are violating the principles of Islam." But 91 percent said that attacks on American troops in Iraq were legitimate, and 92 percent agreed with the goal of "getting the U.S. to withdraw forces from Islamic countries". That gives you a sense of why jihad in Iraq is so vital to Al Qaeda – it’s a place where their violence is popular.





:: Article nr. 32987 sent on 19-may-2007 23:51 ECT


www.uruknet.info?p=32987

One would think that this would be more than enough incentive to resolve the conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine...

Published May 2007

Vol. 7, No. 1 17 May 2007

http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPag...aeda_Connection

The Growing Hamas-Al Qaeda Connection

Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi

Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central authority of governments is collapsing and therefore its current success in the war-torn Gaza Strip should not come as a surprise.
Just after Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new security vacuum that had been created and begun to dispatch its operatives to this territory. By March 2006, no less than the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the London Arabic daily, al-Hayat, "We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in Gaza and the West Bank."
In the meantime across the Middle East the external Hamas leadership maintained close ties with well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda network, like the leader of the Kashmiri organization, Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salahal-Din, in Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden loyalist, in Yemen. The latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.
Significantly al-Hayat reported on April 4, 2006: "a definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza, who had infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. Moreover, a little over a month later Egypt's Ministry of the Interior disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the April 2006 attack on the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab, underwent military training in the use of weapons and explosives in the Gaza Strip.
On May 9, 2007 the "Army of Islam" organization (Jaish al-Islam) published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org), an official announcement in which it took responsibility for the kidnapping of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston and called for the release of the Palestinian sheikh, Abu Qatada, who is considered one of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda in Europe and is known to be the one with whom the heads of the group that carried out 9/11 consulted. Hamas spokesperson, Ayman Taha, acknowledged the fact that Hamas and "Army of Islam" had cooperated on the military operational level.


Increasingly, there are signs that al-Qaeda is gaining strength in the Gaza Strip. In the midst of the decaying internal situation in Gaza, with its regular gun battles between the well-established Hamas and Fatah militias, there are more incidents reported of attacks against symbols of any Western presence from a UNRWA school to a Christian bookstore. Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central authority of governments is collapsing and therefore its current success in the war-torn Gaza Strip should not come as a surprise.1 Seeming to copy the operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the militants in Gaza belonging to these new terrorist organizations are targeting Western reporters, like the famous cases in which journalists from FOX News and the BBC were taken hostage. Even external appearances show al-Qaeda's growing influence as members of its affiliate movements in the Gaza Strip will often wear the same black head covering that was a trademark of the late al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. All the evidence indicates that rather than challenge al-Qaeda's bid to expand its presence in the Gaza Strip, Hamas prefers to collaborate with these new militant groups.





Al-Qaeda Enters Gaza

Just after Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new security vacuum that had been created and began to dispatch its operatives to this territory. The Hamas leader who would later become its first foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, admitted to Corriere della Sera, on September 13, 2005 that "...a pair of men from al-Qaeda has infiltrated into Gaza." Within a month an organization calling itself "Al-Qaeda in Palestine" was distributing leaflets in a Gaza mosque. By March 2006, no less than the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the London Arabic daily, al-Hayat, "We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in Gaza and the West Bank."

While Abbas described this as a "very dangerous situation," no Palestinian security service subsequently took any measures against al-Qaeda. Indeed, this became official Palestinian Authority policy especially after Hamas swept the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 and formed a new government. A Hamas official, Said Sayyam, who became the Palestinian Authority Interior Minister at the time, stated openly that he would not order the arrest of terrorist operatives who would attack Israel; this essentially amounted to an open invitation to global jihadi organizations that they could find a new sanctuary in post-withdrawal Gaza, under Hamas rule. It was the first clear indication that Hamas could work together with elements from al-Qaeda coming into the Gaza Strip. In the meantime across the Middle East the external Hamas leadership maintained close ties with well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda network, like the leader of the Kashmiri organization, Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salah al-Din, in Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden loyalist, in Yemen.2 The latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.





Gaza Becomes an International Terrorist Base

There was one question about al-Qaeda's presence in the Gaza Strip during 2006 that needed to be answered. Did it involve a foreign presence of al-Qaeda operatives from other Arab countries or was this Palestinian al-Qaeda affiliate just a group of Gazans who ideologically identified with global jihad, but had no actual operational links with Osama bin Laden's organization? Significantly al-Hayat answered this question when it reported on April 4, 2006: "a definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza, who had infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen.

Moreover, a little over a month later Egypt's Ministry of the Interior disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the April 2006 attack on the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab, underwent military training in the use of weapons and explosives in the Gaza Strip. They confessed to belonging to an organization called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was also an earlier name for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organization before it became al-Qaeda Iraq.3 Thus al-Qaeda related groups in Gaza appeared to have become involved in military operations and were not just propagating their religious worldview alone.





"The Army of Islam" and al-Qaeda

This year a new aspect of the al-Qaeda presence in the Gaza Strip became evident. On May 9, 2007 the "Army of Islam" organization (Jaish al-Islam) published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org), an official announcement in which it took responsibility for the kidnapping of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston and called for the release of the Palestinian sheikh, Abu Qatada, who is being held in a British prison. Abu Qatada is Sheikh Omar Mahmoud Othman, who is considered one of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda in Europe and is known to be the one with whom the heads of the group that carried out 9/11 consulted.

The announcement by the "Army of Islam," which also appeared in a recording delivered to al-Jazeera, made these additional points:

1. "We will not sit idle in the face of the Crusader attack. . .Britain more than any other state wanted to humiliate the Muslims...it settled the ‘sons of monkeys and pigs' in Palestine...it fights against Islam and the Muslims...and is a partner to the Crusader war against Islam.

2. There is no protection for the British subjects in the Muslim states because the British government is fighting the Muslims, and therefore all of them are fighters [i.e.-they have no protection and can be killed].

3. Alan Johnston is being held under the laws of the Islamic shari'a concerning prisoners...Britain must release our prisoners and particularly the Palestinian Abu Qatada...We do not forget our prisoners in other countries and we say to release all of them, otherwise we will behave the same way toward all of them without exception."

The form and content "Army of Islam" recording generated press speculation about al-Qaeda in Gaza. A Palestinian security source confirmed yet again in an interview to Al-Quds Al-Arabi (May 12, 2007) that al-Qaeda branches indeed have been set up in the Gaza Strip. In fact, it emerges from his statements that there is close cooperation between al-Qaeda in Gaza and the Hamas movement. He identified the "Army of Islam" directly with al-Qaeda, and also noted that it is the one responsible for kidnapping the BBC journalist Alan Johnston and for publishing the demand to release Abu Qatada from the British prison. The same source verified that the local branch of al-Qaeda was established by activists from various Arab states who came into the Gaza Strip from outside the Palestinian Authority. The organization was also responsible for blowing up internet cafes, barbershops, pharmacies, and cellular telephone stores.

The "Army of Islam" was indeed one of the three organizations that kidnapped the Israeli solder Gilad Shalit in the summer of 2006 together with Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees which also had contacts with al-Qaeda.4 This means Hamas and an al-Qaeda branch in Gaza have joined together for operational cooperation in terror attacks against Israel. This fact has been largely overlooked by observers of Middle Eastern affairs. Indeed, Musa Abu Marzuk, the deputy political secretary of Hamas, has commented in the newspaper, al-Liwa (April 10, 1007) that it is an honor for the Hamas government "that it did not arrest a single jihad fighter nor condemn a single action against the Zionist enemy."

Hamas did not want the impression to be given that it had any coordination at present with local al-Qaeda affiliates. The Hamas leadership was probably relieved when the deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at it for agreeing to a Palestinian unity government. But its defensive response indicated that it was still committed to the goals of al-Qaeda, namely resistance and jihad: "Be assured, Dr. Ayman...Hamas is still the same movement it has been since its foundation." 5

Hamas spokesperson, Ayman Taha, acknowledged the fact that Hamas and "Army of Islam" had cooperated on the military operational level. However he claimed that "the contacts between Hamas and ‘Army of Islam' existed only in the beginning while abducting the (Israeli soldier Gilad) Shalit, I think it was ended a while ago."6

Nevertheless, Muhammad al-Madhoun (Hamas), a political adviser to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, confirmed (Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, May 10, 2007) that the demands that were made in the "Army of Islam's" recording detailing the terms for Johnston's release were the same ones the group conveyed clandestinely to the Hamas government. For Hamas it was clear who was responsible for the abduction. In an official announcement after the video clip was broadcasted Hamas said: "taking responsibility of Johnston's abduction made it clear and didn't leave any room for speculations with regard to the organization responsible for the abduction, which we had known from the first moment."7

Just after the British journalist was abducted Hamas on its website called on the Palestinian government "to issue immediate orders and to chase the criminal group which caused harm to the supreme national interest of our people, to arrest them and to beat strongly on their hands in order to make them a lesson for others."8 However, Hamas kept quiet and never took any actions against "Army of Islam." In other words Hamas knew right from the start about the "Army of Islam" operation yet did not intervene to free the British reporter and dismantle the "Army of Islam."

The Palestinian government, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, has for some time been involved in contacts aimed at freeing Johnston. Haniyeh disclosed in mid-April that there is close cooperation with British officials, who are given relevant information obtained by Palestinian security operatives.

The Johnston affair reveals, then, the complexity of the reality of Palestinian terror. The Hamas prime minister is working for the release of a British journalist who was kidnapped by al-Qaeda, which is maintaining close operational cooperation with Hamas. Since it came to power, Hamas has had no interest in acting against the al-Qaeda branch that is functioning in the Gaza Strip but is interested in preventing an international crisis that would likely harm the Palestinian
Authority, and it criticizes the "Army of Islam" only for its "mistaken choice" of a target. The Palestinian Authority thereby shows that it has no moral legitimacy to demand to be recognized as a political entity like other nations and that it is an entity providing sanctuary for international terrorism.



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Notes



1 Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007.

2 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "Understanding the Direction of the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and al-Qaeda Jihadism" in Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 5, No. 22, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs/Institute for Contemporary Affairs, April 6, 2006.

3 "The Egyptian Interior Ministry exposed operative collaboration between terrorist elements in Sinai (connected to the Global Jihad and suspected of involvement in the attacks at Dahab) and Palestinian terrorist elements in the Gaza Strip (whose identity is unclear)," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), May 26, 2006. See: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_mul...ahab_250506.htm.

4 http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-24.htm http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article....RTICLE_ID=50340 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3388249,00.html

5 "Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at the Hamas movement once again, accusing it of abandoning jihad and ‘selling Palestine' for seats in the Palestinian unity government. Hamas spokesmen defended their political activity, stressing the continuing adherence of the movement to its radical principles, namely ‘resistance' and ‘jihad,' and non-recognition of Israel." Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), March 22, 2007. See: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_mul..._zawahiri_e.htm.

6 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), May 10, 2007.

7 http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Lan...amp;DSNO=981543

8 http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default....Tzfcn5pbwbrw%3d



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Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

So we have truly sunken to the level of those who we claim to be superior to --- in our way of life --- in our choice of government --- in our respect for human dignity...

The right will use this as a justification for torturing Al Qaeda and other terrorist suspects --- for continuing renditions --- etc.

As we slide down the slippery slope of further degrading our moral compass it will truly take its toll as we provide more and more impetus for al Qaeda to recruit ---

Our only chance of winning the war against Islamic extremism is to take the high road --- and appear moderate not just to the international community in general --- but the Islamist community in particular.

As long as we are perceived as just as unreasonable as the terrorists -- they will win in terms of garnering support financially and otherwise in the Muslim world...

Military declassifies 'al-Qaeda torture manual' recovered in Iraq

http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2007/...ary_declas.html

The Pentagon has released what it describes as an al-Qaeda torture manual. The collection of graphic drawings, which are said to show ways the terrorist group extracts information from prisoners, was reportedly recovered during a raid on a terrorist hideout in Iraq.

"Some of the drawings show how to drill hands, sever limbs, drag victims behind cars, remove eyes, put a blowtorch or iron to someone’s skin, suspend a person from a ceiling and electrocute them, break limbs and restrict breath and put someone’s head in a vice," according to Fox News Channel.

A military spokesman tells CNN that "they made it in a cartoon manner, so that no matter what your literacy rate, what nationality you are, all you've got to do is look at these pictures to understand how to conduct tortures of innocent people."

Today: Shiite cleric returns to Iraq

A search of the safe house turned up "electric drills, hammers, blow torches, meat cleavers, pliers and wire cutters, chains, screw drivers, whips and handcuffs," Fox News reports.

According to a military statement that was released Monday: After a thorough search of the building, ground forces found a padlocked room. Inside were four men and a boy who had been kidnapped and severely beaten with chains, cables and hoses. The four captives also showed signs of torture, and the boy stated the terrorists had hooked electrical wires to his tongue and shocked him.

You can see the sketches at The Smoking Gun. Warning: These images are very graphic.